The Battle of Xuân Lộc

  The following article is a section, titled "The Battle of Xuân Lộc," in the historical and factual notes accompanying the short story "I Did Not Die" (Cao-Đắc 2014, 210-255) in the short story collection “Fire In The Rain,” (Cao-Đắc, Tuấn. 2014. Fire In The Rain. Hellgate Press, Oregon, U.S.A.) The story "I Did Not Die" is a fictionalized account based on true events in South Vietnam in April 1975. One significant event is the battle of Xuân Lộc which took place from April 9 to April 20. This section includes notes that support various details and scenes depicted in the story and therefore is not intended to be a coherent essay.

The battle of Xuân Lộc:

The battle of Xuân Lộc has been fairly well reported, though not as fully as other battles (e.g., Huế in the Tết Offensive of 1968, An Lộc in the Easter Offensive of 1972), by American and Vietnamese authors (Nguyễn 2001, 783-797; Veith 2012; Veith and Pribbenow II 2004). The most detailed account of the battle is provided by George J. Veith and Merle L. Pribbenow II (Veith and Pribbenow II 2004). 

Davidson (1988, 790) comments that Xuân Lộc produced one of the epic battles of any of the Indochina wars and certainly was the most heroic ARVN stand in the Vietnam War. According to Le Gro (2006, 174), General Smith reports that the ARVN showed unmistakably its determination, its will and its courage to fight even though the odds were heavily weighted against them. Tucker (1999, 185) comments that although they were heavily outnumbered, Đao’s troops fought on courageously in what was probably the most heroic stand of any ARVN division of the war. Le Gro (2006, 173) writes that the South Vietnamese fought splendidly at Xuân Lộc while the NVA high command used the battle as a ‘meat grinder,’ sacrificing its own units to destroy irreplaceable ARVN forces. Harry F. Noyes III (Noyes) comments that by all accounts, the Xuân Lộc battle was as heroic as anything in the annals of U.S. military history. 

The soldiers of the 18th Division were hailed as the heroes of Xuân Lộc (Dawson 1977, 315). Several officers of the ARVN provide detailed information on Brig. Gen. Lê Minh Đảo (who was promoted to Maj. Gen. right after the battle) and the battle itself, including the preparation; the ferocious fighting; the heroic contribution of other ARVN units such as the local defense forces, the airbornes, the rangers, and the armored; and the well executed retreat (Bảo 2010; Hồ Ðinh; Hứa 2011; Vương 2005). American sources also provide information on the battle, its aftermath and consequences (Dawson 1977, 233-236, 237-240, 257-258, 267-268, 284-285, 301-302; Todd 1990, 254-256; Tucker 1999, 185-187).

The forces of two sides were: (1) five to six thousand men of the ARVN 18th Division and the supporting troops from other units; and (2) thirty to forty thousand troops of the PAVN (Maclear 1982, 329; Karnow 1997, 682; Bảo 2010; Duong 2008, 206). Initially, PAVN General Trà threw three divisions into Xuân Lộc (the 341st, the 7th, and the 6th), and later two more divisions (325th and 312th) for a total of five divisions and regiment 95B (Bảo 2010; Todd 1990, 254). The 341st was not an elite division; some soldiers weren’t even sixteen (Todd 1990, 255). Clodfelter (1995, 214) reports 25,000 South Vietnamese troops were committed to the defense of Xuân Lộc. This number is obviously in error because there was only an understrength 18th Division of about five thousand troops, three reinforcement battalions from the Airborne Division, and an armored task force on Route 1 (Clodfelter 1995, 214).

Figure 1: The emblem of the ARVN 18th Infantry Division

The ARVN Rangers (Biệt Động Quân) were one of the most well-respected military formations of the South Vietnamese armed forces (RVNHS, Vu 2011). Among various units, the 82nd Ranger Battalion contributed to the defense of Xuân Lộc valiantly (Duong 2008, 204; Vương 2005; Veith 2012, 254, 441-442, 444). With only 300 men (Veith 2012, 254),“[t]he 82nd fought two battalions of the 209th to a standstill and destroyed two more tanks” (Veith 2012, 444). In particular, Major Vương Mộng Long, the heroic commander of the 82nd Ranger Battalion (Duong 2008, 204), described a three-step maneuver used by his three-man teams to destroy the NVA tanks (Vương 2005). First, the 12.8-mm gun on the tank had to be silenced. Second, phosphorous or smoke grenades were tossed out to blind the gunners on another NVA tank nearby so that they could not fire accurately at the approaching Rangers. Third, the M-72 was fired aiming at the rear of the tank where the protecting steel layer was the thinnest.

On the first day of the battle, the PAVN suffered seven hundred casualties and the South Vietnamese fifty (Veith 2012, 445; Veith and Pribbenow II 2004, 190). After four days, the casualties were two thousand for PAVN and several hundred for the South Vietnamese (Veith and Pribbenow II 2004, 199; Butler 1985, 256), with NVAs killed and left on the battlefield exceeding 1200 (Le Gro 2006, 174). Nearly 30 tanks had been wiped out (Le Gro 2006, 174). The final casualties on both sides include estimates of 30% of ARVN participating units and 60% of Task Force 52 on the South Vietnamese side and 5,000 to 6,000 casualties on the Communist side (Duong 2008, 206; Lam 2009, 236; Hứa 2011; Nguyễn 2001, 789). Tucker (1999, 185, 187) reports the Communists suffered 37 destroyed tanks and over 5,000 deaths, and ARVN suffered 7,500 casualties (deaths and wounded). Tucker’s ARVN casualty number perhaps was taken from Clodfelter (1995, 214), which exaggerates the figures. The casualty figure of 7,500 ARVN is clearly unrealistic because the total ARVN troops committed to the battle was only an understrength division and a few battalions from other units. Even the Communists admitted that the battle was fierce and the NVA suffered serious setbacks (quoted in Veith 2012, 445, 447; Van 1977, 167).

The reduction of the South Vietnamese stockpiles of fuel, weapons, and ammunition after the Paris Peace Accords is well known (Le Gro 2006, 84-86; Colvin 1996, 293; Veith and Pribbenow II 2004, 185). The performance of the 18th Division and its commander, Brigadier General Lê Minh Đảo, was said to be superb (Veith and Pribbenow II 2004, 163; Hosmer 1980, 242; Sorley 1999, 378; Willbanks 2008, 267). Đảo was a rarity and “had actually fought for and earned most of the medals he never bothered to wear on his chest” (Dawson 1977, 234). 

In the end, Xuân Lộc was not overrun by the North Vietnamese Army. Rather, both sides decided to withdraw from Xuân Lộc for tactical reasons (Dawson 1977, 268; Nguyễn 2001; Veith 2012, 449-452; Veith and Pribbenow II 2004, 197, 207-208; Butler 1985, 508; Cao 2005, 132). General Trần Văn Trà of the PAVN decided to move the attack on the outer periphery toward Biên Hòa (Veith 2012, 451; Van 1977, 167; Todd 1990, 298; Duong 2008, 205). 

The use of the M-72 and the 2.75-inch rockets to destroy the NVA tanks is well reported (Veith 2012, 443; Veith and Pribbenow II 2004, 188). “As the tanks pressed forward, the soldiers of the 43rd Regiment had another surprise waiting for them: 2.75-inch rockets, normally used by helicopter gunships, mounted on bipods and fired using simple electrical batteries” (Veith 2012, 443). It was reported that two technicians accidentally ignited the rocket with a voltage meter while trying to find a short in one of the rocket pods (VNGear). It was unknown if the ARVN learned this simple technique of firing the rocket from this incident.

The terrifying bomb(s) dropped on Xuân Lộc:

The exact details on the bomb(s) that was/were dropped on Xuân Lộc on the eve of the battle are not known with certainty. While it is known that this bomb or these bombs caused significant deaths in a NVA regiment, the identity of the bomb(s) remains unclear. These bombs have been confusingly identified as either the Daisy Cutters (BLU-82) or the CBU-55’s, or both. 

The designation CBX-11 for the bomb in the novel is fictitious [TCĐ: In the story “I did not die,” the bomb is fictitiously referred to as CBX-11]. It represents a sort of bomb that had a devastating destructive power and used Fuel Air Explosives. It could be dropped from a high-flying aircraft, with or without an on-board guidance unit. This fictitious bomb can be thought of as a combination of the Daisy Cutter and the CBU-55.

The Daisy Cutters, or BLU (Bomb Live Unit)-82 (nicknamed “Big Blue 82”), and the CBU (Cluster Bomb Unit)-55 are two totally different types of bomb. They differ in several basic aspects (Parsch): 

Dimensions and Weights: The Daisy Cutter BLU-82/B is larger and much heavier than the CBU-55. BLU-82/B: Length (without nose probe): 3.50 m, Diameter: 1.37 m, Weight: 6,800 kg (15,000 lb). CBU-55: The CBU-55 used a dispenser called SUU-49A/B, which contains three BLU-73/B FAE bombs. Dimensions for SUU-49 A/B: Length: 2.2 m, Diameter: 35.6 cm, Finspan: 71.9 cm. Dimensions for BLU-73/B: Length (without probe): 69.6 cm, Diameter: 34.5 cm, Weight: 59 kg (130 lb). Overall weight of CBU-55: 750 lb or 490 lb (Parsch).

Explosives: The Daisy Cutter BLU-82/B uses conventional explosives, the GSX (Gelled Slurry Explosive) slurry (mix of ammonium nitrate, aluminum powder and polystyrene). The CBU-55 uses three live bomb units: BLU-73A/B. The BLU-73/B was an FAE (Fuel Air Explosive) bomb containing 33 kg of ethylene oxide. It was delivered from aerial dispensers, and was equipped with a retarding and stabilizing drogue chute. A proximity fuse detonated the initial charge about 9 m above ground to form the fuel aerosol cloud. When the BLU-73/B's 1.22 m long extendible nose probe hit the ground, a second charge ignited the fuel/air mixture. 

Delivery method: BLU-82/B can only be dropped by specially modified MC-130 Hercules transport aircraft. The BLU-82/B is loaded onto a cradle and stored in the MC-130's cargo hold. Minimum drop altitude is about 1830 m (6,000 ft.) above ground; (otherwise, the MC-130 could be endangered by the bomb's blast). The cradle with the bomb is then pulled out of the aircraft by an extraction parachute, after which the bomb separates from the cradle and descends in a nose-down attitude under its own stabilization and retarding parachute. The BLU-82/B is fitted with a 96.5 cm long "Daisy Cutter" fuse extension in the nose to trigger an above-ground explosion. This optimizes the blast effects and reduces undesired crater creation. The name "Daisy Cutter" somehow has been used incorrectly to refer to the bomb itself instead of the fusing system (Parsch). A video showing the dropping of a BLU-82 is posted on YouTube (YouTube). 

The CBU-55 uses SUU-49/B which could be carried only by helicopters or low-speed aircraft. The most accurate delivery method was a level drop at about 800 feet AGL (Above Ground Level), 180-230 KIAS (Knots Indicated Airspeed), with a one second time delay on the fuse (LASF 1972, 6). 

(d) Destructive power: It is unknown which bomb has more destructive power. However, the CBU-55 is said to be the most powerful non-nuclear weapon in the U.S. arsenal (Clodfelter 1995, 215; Tucker 1999, 185). In addition to incinerating the enemy, it also kills the enemy by depriving the victims of an air supply, sucking the oxygen out of the lungs, and letting them suffocate in the vacuum (Clodfelter 1995, 215; Dawson 1977, 302; Snepp 2002, 416; Tucker 1999, 185).

(e) Date of first use in the Vietnam War: The Daisy Cutter BLU-82/B was first used in March 1970 (Parsch). The CBU-55 was first used in May 1971 (LASF 1972, 5). 

(f) Usage in the Vietnam War: The BLU-82/B was used in Vietnam to clear large helicopter landing sites in the jungle with a single weapons drop (Parsch). The CBU-55 was used in Vietnam for mine-clearing (detonating the mines by the overpressure of the FAE's explosion) and as an anti-personnel weapon (LASF 1972, 5).

It is unclear when the South Vietnamese Air Force had at their disposal the Daisy Cutter or the CBU-55, but they used the Daisy Cutter and the CBU-55 before April 1975. A Daisy Cutter bomb was reportedly dropped by the South Vietnamese Air Force onto a communist supply concentration in November 1974 (Mikesh 2005, 141) and the South Vietnamese were reportedly provided with 17 of the Daisy Cutters and 15 of them were used (ibid.). It appears that the South Vietnamese High Command were aware of the existence of the Daisy Cutters before April 1975. Even if the date of November 1974 is inaccurate, it is well known that the Daisy Cutters were used by the Americans in March 1970 (Parsch). 

Similarly, the CBU-55 was used routinely by the U.S. Black Ponies from 1971-1972 in the Mekong Delta region. According to declassified documents from the U.S. Navy, the CBU-55 Fuel Air Explosive (FAE) bombs had been routinely used by the Light Attack Squadron Four, VAL-4, of the U.S. Navy in the Mekong Delta region of South Vietnam during 1971-1972 (LASF 1972, 5). The VAL-4’s pilots, who called themselves “Black Ponies,” flew the OV-10A Bronco that dropped the CBU-55 FAE, parachute-retarded bombs in preplanned strikes (Lavell 2009, 18, 21, 214-216). “These strikes were normally used to clear an area of booby traps, mines, bunkers, and personnel prior to an ARVN sweep or insert.” (LASF 1972, 5). “First used in May 1971, the CBU-55 FAE has proven to be an extremely effective weapon in deterring the enemy” (ibid., 5). “The CBU-55 is a cluster bomb unit, free fall, parachute stabilized, fuel-air explosive weapon. Due to the high pressure produced in the detonation of this weapon, the CBU-55 has been an ideal weapon against well-entrenched, well-bunkered personnel, for troop insertion preparations, and for clearing an area of booby traps and mines” (ibid., 6). The minimum safe distance from friendly units when using the CBU-55 was 500 meters (ibid., 8). From May 1971, when the CBU-55 was first used, until March 1972, the total number of CBU-55 bombs that were dropped in the Mekong Delta region was 1,199 (755 in 1971 and 444 in 1972). The ARVN troops were well aware of the CBU-55 and “increasingly requested it to be used to penetrate bunkers, caves, and tunnels,” and “even created an elite club from among those who worked with the weapon, its members distinguished by the long, red cloth ribbon and CBU arming safety pin that they wore around their necks.” (Lavell 2009, 213). Therefore, the CBU-55 was known by the ARVN, at least by the 21st Infantry Division and the IV Corps, since 1971.

It also appears the South Vietnamese Air Force had experience using the CBU-55 prior to April 1975. It was reported that a South Vietnamese pilot, Lieutenant Nguyễn Hàn, dropped a CBU-55 on an NVA tank column at Đông Hà Bridge on May 1, 1972 in the Easter Offensive of 1972 (NgyThanh 2009). Although it was not the first time the CBU-55 was used in Vietnam, it was perhaps the first time it was used by the South Vietnamese Air Force. It was also reported that the South Vietnamese Air Force dropped 9 CBUs (confusingly noted as Daisy Cutters) in Xuân Lộc (Trọng 2007).

There is no consensus among the sources regarding the specific details on the dropping of the Daisy Cutters (BLU-82) and CBU-55 bombs on the eve of the Xuân Lộc battle, but most sources agree that those bombs were indeed dropped on the NVAs. On April 3, 1975, a request for the Daisy Cutters (BLU-82) was made to the Americans and Eric Von Marbod, deputy assistant secretary of defense, promised to send a few (Nguyen and Schecter 1986, 300) or twenty-seven (Cao 2005, 127). There was no mention of the CBU-55. However, Snepp (2002, 416) indicates that it was the CBU-55 that Von Marbod and General Weyan promised in early April.

Sources disagree on: 

(a) the number of dropped CBU-55 or BLU-82/B bombs: one (Clodfelter 1995, 215; Lam 2001, 386; Snepp 2002, 416; quoted in Veith 2012, 458; Veith and Pribbenow II 2004, 211) or two or more than one (Tucker 1999, 185; Karnow 1997, 682; Nguyễn 2001, 788; Duong 2008, 206). 

(b) the resulting casualties: from 250 (Clodfelter 1995, 215; Dawson 1977, 302; Snepp 2002, 416) to several thousand or an entire regiment (Lam 2001, 387; Cao 2005, 133).

(c) the identity of the official ordering or requesting the bombing: Brig. Gen. Đảo requested permission to use the BLU-82 (Lam 2009, 235; Hứa 2011; Trọng 2007); General Toàn, the MR III commander, suggested asking for one last B-52 raid, but the CBU-55 was used instead (Snepp 2002, 416); Maj. Gen. Homer Smith gave the official go-ahead (Dawson 1977, 301); General Toàn ordered dropping two Daisy Cutters (Nguyễn 2001, 788); General Trần Quang Khôi ordered the use of two CBUs (Trọng 2007); General Cao Văn Viên ordered the VNAF to drop two Daisy Cutters (Duong 2008, 206). (General Nguyễn Cao Kỳ also claimed to request the bomb but his claim can be quickly dismissed because he was not actively involved in the command of the battle.)

(d) The type of bombs that were actually used: CBU-55 (Veith and Pribbenow II 2004, 211; Snepp 2002, 416; Lam 2001, 386; Tucker 1999, 185; Karnow 1997, 682; Vo 2004, 17) or Daisy Cutters (BLU-82) (Lam 2009, 235; Nguyễn 2001, 788; Todd 1990, 215, 422 fn 1; Tran 2009, 199; Cao 2005, 127-128, 133; Hứa 2011; Duong 2008, 206).

(e) The date the CBU-55 or Daisy Cutter was dropped: April 16 (Lam 2009, 235; Nguyễn 2001, 788; Duong 2008, 206), April 19 (Darcourt 1976, 109; Dương 2007, 183; Lam 2001, 386), April 21 (Dawson 1977, 301), or April 22 (Clodfelter 1995, 215; Snepp 2002, 416).

It appears that the Daisy Cutters were dropped first on April 12 (Le Gro 2006, 174), and some seven to ten days later, the CBU-55 (Clodfelter 1995, 215; Darcourt 1976; Veith and Pribbenow II 2004, 203, 211; Snepp 2002, 416). Todd (1990, 298) writes that three Daisy Cutters were delivered on April 16, together with an American bomb expert. The time of the dropping of the bomb, either the Daisy Cutter or the CBU-55, was reported to be late evening (Darcourt 1976, 109; Dương 2007, 193) or 1:00AM (Cao 2005, 128). The location was reported to be on top of the command post of the 341st NVA Division (Snepp 2002, 416; quoted from Snepp in Veith 2012, 458). The stockpile of the CBU-55 or the Daisy Cutters was reported to be 6 (Cao 2005, 129; Todd 1990, 215, 422 fn 1) or approximately 1,000 CBUs (Lam 2001, 387). Although the number 1,000 appears high, as noted above, the U.S. Navy dropped more than 1,000 CBU-55 bombs in the Mekong Delta area during 1971-1972. 

Dawson (1977, 301-302) describes in vivid detail the dropping of the CBU-55. According to Dawson, a plane circled Xuân Lộc at 20,000 feet twice. Then, the clamshell doors at the back of the plane opened on their hydraulics. Two crewmen untied a pallet on the ball-bearing casters on the floor and pushed it toward the back of the plane. A drogue parachute opened as the pallet and the CBU-55 hit the air. When the pallet and the bomb hit the ground, the wooden platform broke into small fragments. “Parts of the bomb exploded, hurling the various sections far and wide, as much as 120 yards from where they had hit. The gas canisters opened, and the propane and the secret blend wafted out over a four-acre area” (Dawson 1977, 301-302).

However, Dawson’s description of the bomb and the use of a high-flying aircraft appear consistent with the Daisy Cutter BLU-82/B, not the CBU-55. On the other hand, other sources’ description of the scene after the explosion appears to be consistent with the CBU-55.

Pierre Darcourt, a French journalist who visited Xuân Lộc on April 19 on the eve of the battle, provided an account of what happened. The bomb was dropped in the evening. Darcourt (1976, 116) observed three bright blasts flash successively and three violent explosions that were stifled like grenades exploding under water. His observation of three blasts and explosions appears to match with three BLU-73A/B bomb units inside the CBU-55. Early the next morning, Colonel Phước, the Province Chief, took him to the horrifying scene of death. According to Darcourt (Darcourt 1976, 117; Dương 2007, 194-195), hundreds of dismembered North Vietnamese troops scattered in a hole of about 100 meters on each side and the corpses had no traces of injury, having just a little dried blood around the mouth and nose. It appeared that they had been whirled up high and tossed flat down. Darcourt (ibid.) also saw a tank turned upside down and the trees blown together at the scene.

As an eyewitness, Darcourt describes the aftermath with vivid details. His account left no doubt that a CBU-55 was indeed dropped on an NVA regiment, most likely part of the 341st Division. According to Darcourt, Colonel Phước obtained the exact coordinates of the location of the NVA concentration from a report of the Special Forces Airborne Thunder Tiger (Lôi Hổ) Recon Team 6, and radioed Biên Hoà Air Base (Darcourt 1976, 116; Dương 2007, 193). Some ten minutes later, the CBU-55 was dropped (Darcourt 1976, 116; Dương 2007, 193). The quick response appears to indicate that it was indeed the CBU-55 and not the Daisy Cutter because it normally takes a much longer time to load the Daisy Cutter inside the C-130 aircraft.

Since the Daisy Cutter and the CBU-55 had been used extensively in South Vietnam before 1975, their destructive power had been known for some time by both the South Vietnamese and the North Vietnamese. However, it should be noted that before April 1975 both the Daisy Cutter and the CBU-55 bombs were mostly used for jungle clearing or pre-strikes where concentration of enemy troops was not high. Furthermore, most uses were likely to target the Vietcong and not the NVAs. Accordingly, the surprise from the NVAs on the devastating power of the bomb dropped at Xuân Lộc on April 19 (or April 21/22) appears to be expected. 

One can then surmise that the spectacular bomb(s) that was/were dropped on Xuân Lộc in April 1975 might not be the CBU-55, or it may be the CBU-55 with a different type of explosives, or it was used in conjunction with the BLU-82/B, or most likely it was dropped on highly concentrated NVA troops. The C-130 airplane altitude at 20,000 feet, described by Dawson and Snepp, is much higher than the one that was used during 1971-1972 (800 feet to 2800 feet), indicating that it carried the Daisy Cutter, and not the CBU-55. The CBU was not “an easy weapon to drop accurately because the slightest wind could turn an otherwise accurate delivery into a fiasco after [the pilots] released the bomb” (Lavell 2009, 213). On the other hand, on the eve of the battle of Xuân Lộc when civilians had been evacuated and the ARVN troops had withdrawn, leaving the area swarmed with NVA troops, it appears likely that extreme delivery accuracy was not needed. Furthermore, according to Darcourt’s account, it appears that the CBU-55 was dropped by a low-altitude aircraft.

Regardless of whether the bomb was BLU-82/B or CBU-55, the reason why it was dropped at such a late stage of the battle was unclear. Dawson (1977, 302) suggests it was to “punish” the NVAs. Others believe it was designed to slow down the advance of the NVAs toward Saigon.

The NVA troops were terrified by the devastating power of the bomb(s), thinking they were nuclear weapons (Colvin 1996, 286; Cao 2005, 202) or biological weapons (Snepp 2002, 416). Hanoi and even Communist Chinese vehemently protested and accused the Americans and the South Vietnamese of using illegal weapons of mass destruction (Snepp 2002, 416).

It was further believed that additional bombings were carried out by American planes (Snepp 2002, 416). These secret missions might have been carried out without the knowledge of the South Vietnamese High Command and this may explain why some South Vietnamese officers, including the Generals, insisted that only the Daisy Cutters were used and not the CBU-55. The missions were kept secret because the U.S. didn’t want it known publicly that American aircraft were used.

© 2014 Cao-Đắc Tuấn

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Laurie, Bill. 2006. The Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces 1968-1975. 

http://vnafmamn.com/ARVN_68-75.html (truy cập 29-9-2013).

NgyThanh. 2009. Chiến Hữu: Kỷ Niệm Nhỏ Với Đồng Đội Chiến Trường Xưa… (Comrades: A small souvenir with comrades in the old battle…). 

http://motgoctroi.com/StLichsu/LSCandai/VNCH/QLVNCH/ChienHuu.htm (truy cập 29-9-2013).

Noyes III, Harry F. Không rõ năm. Heroic Allies. http://www.vietamericanvets.com/Page-Records-HeroicAllies.htm (truy cập 29-9-2013).

Parsch, Andreas. Không rõ năm. CBU – Cluster Bombs. 

http://www.designation-systems.net/usmilav/asetds/u-c.html#_CBU; 

http://www.designation-systems.net/usmilav/asetds/u-b.html#_BLU73 (truy cập 29-9-2013).

RVNHS (Republic of Vietnam Historical Society). Insignia of the ARVN Rangers. http://rvnhs.com/museum/bietdongquaninsignia.html (truy cập 29-9-2013).

Trọng Đạt. 2007. Trận Xuân Lộc Chiến thắng cuối cùng của QĐVNCH (Xuân Lộc battle, the last victory of the ARVN) and Về quả BOM thả trong Trận Long Khánh (About the bomb dropped in the battle at Long Khánh). Đăng 23-5-2007.

http://ongvove.wordpress.com/2009/04/22/tr%e1%ba%adn-xuan-l%e1%bb%99c-chi%e1%ba%bfn-th%e1%ba%afng-cu%e1%bb%91i-cung-c%e1%bb%a7a-qdvnch/ (truy cập 30-9-2013).

VNGear. Không rõ năm. 2.75 Inch Folding Fin Aerial Rocket (FFAR). 

http://www.vietnamgear.com/kit.aspx?kit=501 (truy cập 30-9-2013).

Vương Mộng Long. 2005. Tháng Tư Lại Về (April re-returns). Đăng 7-4-2005. 

http://lengoctuyhuong.wordpress.com/2012/04/30/thang-t%C6%B0-l%E1%BA%A1i-v%E1%BB%81-h%E1%BB%93i-ky-c%E1%BB%A7a-v%C6%B0%C6%A1ng-m%E1%BB%99ng-long-k20/ (truy cập 30-9-2013).

YouTube. Unknown Date. BLU-82 Daisy Cutter. 

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_upy14pesi4&feature=related (truy cập 30-9-2013).